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Abstract. The emergence of systems identified as both safety and se-
curity critical has motivated research and industry communities to search
for novel approaches to conduct multi-concern engineering (co-engineering).
But several aspects and issues have arisen during the process what has
limited the advances. Among them, there are the specificities found in
concepts, methods and development cycles, the current standalone prac-
tices of safety and security, and the lack of consolidated metrics for safety-
security assessment. This paper presents synthetic discussions on referred
topics along with some suggestions for solutions and perspectives.
Keywords: safety · security · development cycle · co-engineering · MDE
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1 Introduction
Safety and security are topics often referred in the literature as major concerns
to be addressed in systems engineering. Along with the difficulties found in
the practice of safety and security in their usual standalone mode, research and
industry should also face new challenges arisen from the need of a common prac-
tice. The referred need does not only obey to a mere optimization of resources,
but it is essentially generated by the emergence - or evolution - of application
domains which are identified as both safety and security critical. Indeed, the ob-
served dependencies between safety and security aspects in different use cases,
the potential conflicts between proposed solutions, the variety of development
and analysis methods, and the growing number of exigencies to improve sys-
tems’ trustworthiness lead to a singular problematics. Structuring the aspects
for a seamless co-engineering process is a vast, complex and, thus, very tough
task. This short paper aims to describe, in a non-exhaustive manner, some as-
pects to move forward, highlight identified issues and perspectives for solutions,
and, finally, address some questions that may enrich the ongoing discussions. In
particular, it aims to raise attention on the need for a common practice of safety
and security via the consistent integration of known techniques.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The section 2 presents a concep-
tual positioning of safety and security. The section 3 gives an overview of the
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standards ecosystem. A MDE approach that can be leveraged for safety-security
co-engineering is explained in section 4. Some difficulties to achieve integration
and adoption of safety and security development cycles comes in section 5. A
discussion on the consistent integration of safety and security techniques is given
in section 6. Finally, the overall perspectives come in section 7.
2 Positioning safety and security
This section introduces a minimal background to make explicit what safety and
security stand for in this paper. To do so, some application domains are recalled
including representative use cases which are recognized by the community as
both safety and security critical. Afterwards, a conceptual positioning of safety
w.r.t. security (or conversely) is given. This positioning helps to highlight com-
monalities and also specificities of both areas.
2.1 Application domains positioning w.r.t. safety and security
Industry application domains are defined by categories of problematics and by
the technology applied/developed to tackle them. A wide variety of systems are
developed within each application domain. They include software and hardware
artifacts structured by an architecture which is often networked. Despite there
is no consensus on metrics to assess criticality, the systems are labeled as critical
regarding the goals and missions they should/must accomplish and the potential
unwanted impacts of not succeeding in doing so. Several instances of critical sys-
tems can be found in aerospace, railway, automotive, health, and nuclear domains
but also in other sectors like e-commerce, e-voting, and social-network based sys-
tems. The operation of systems in the different domains has been impacted by
the evolution of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and by the
progress in autonomy, automation and - more recently - in artificial intelligence
techniques. Despite these evolutions, it is likely that the emerging systems will
lead to a few new relevant risks, i.e., risks that have not been foreseen nor already
faced by human-beings. If that occurs, our current paradigms to perceive sys-
tems’ criticality will remain valid across time irrespective of the type of concern.
However, what is changing for sure is the increasing gain in (1) usage of ICT over
formerly manual works and missions, (2) systems automation, smartness, and
complexity, and (3) physical and virtual accessibility of systems. All in all, the
main stake is the trustworthiness that human-beings have on those systems, i.e.,
the proved reliability, safety, security, etc. of those highly automated-networked-
complex systems. By definition, catastrophic risks related to a safety critical
system endanger human-being lives [1]. As long as those systems exhibit the
three features previously listed, they will also become security critical. Thus for
instance, a railway system including ICT artifacts, mostly automated, and phys-
ically and virtually accessible will certainly face critical security risks. On the
contrary, certain security critical systems will be in no way safety-related, e.g.,
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e-voting, e-commerce, social network, mobile-communication systems (see Fig-
ure 1). This implies that safety and security depend upon technical specificities
of application domains. The identification, assessment and management of risks
may demand a clear understanding of them.
Fig. 1. Relationship between safety and security critical systems
2.2 Conceptual positioning of safety and security
The current standalone practices of safety and security consists in separately
integrate them into an engineering development cycle. The outcome is a couple
of concern-oriented cycles that allow engineers to separately perform the differ-
ent development phases up to the system disposal. Figure 2 roughly depicts the
current state of safety and security engineering processes and their fundamen-
tal elements. Regarding the intersection between safety and security engineering
processes, we can highlight the existence of commonalities between both pro-
cesses. More specifically, there are conceptually similar terms and notions in
both areas, like for instance, risk, severity, likelihood, etc. As long as those terms
and notions are proven to be semantically related, they constitute a basis for a
common safety-security engineering process. But constitute such common basis
is rather bulky, in particular, due to the variability of terms and notions found
in standards, methods, guides and other technical documents. Some aspects to
consider when determining notions similarity are:
Syntactically similar terms with different meanings. It refers to syntactically
similar terms used in both safety and security having different meanings. For
instance, even if the term Feared Event is used in both safety and security risks
analyses, it does not necessarily have the same meaning nor structural form. A
Feared Event in safety can be considered as a combination of a hazard and an
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Fig. 2. Conceptual positioning of safety and security elements
operational situation [2] whereas a Feared Event in security can be the violation
of a security goal [3] which is structured by a set of requirements, typed by a
criterion or property (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity).
Syntactically different terms with equivalent meanings. In this case, two different
terms respectively used in safety and security stand for the same notion. For
instance, the term Threat Condition introduced in the standards ED202 [5],
ED-203 [6] mostly correspond to the notion of Feared Event found in standards
like ISO-27005 [3] and also in methods like EBIOS [4].
It is expected that a common engineering process shall include metrics useful
to evaluate both safety and security risks. Referred metrics are necessary when
paths to risks combine both safety and security events, and their likelihood of
occurrence and severity of impact need to be evaluated. Along with previous
commonalities, several specificities have been already identified:
Specific criteria for evaluation. The technical criteria for evaluation of safety
and security are almost specific to each area. Known security criteria are for
instance authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, freshness, con-
trolled access, etc. On the other side, relevant safety criteria are for instance
reliability, availability, maintainability, etc. Even if for some cases certain crite-
ria are common to both areas, for instance availability), to our knowledge, most
of the criteria remain specific either to security or to safety.
Different nature of events. Safety and security analyses aim to asses the robust-
ness of a system w.r.t. certain unwanted events. However, the nature of those
events is rather different for each analysis. As for safety events, we can mention
accidents, system failures and functions faults. As for security events, we can
mention cyber or physical attacks, e.g., intrusions, and intentional damages and
failures. Therefore, the physics of components, the system usage and its exposure
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to an environment are the root causes of safety events. On the contrary, secu-
rity events are mostly determined by human-related factors like the motivations,
gains and opportunities of attackers. In addition, successful events may require
for an attacker to acquire certain knowledge, skills, and resources.
3 Standards, development cycles and methods
3.1 Standards ecosystem
A wide variety of standards have been published targeting safety or security
aspects. The Figure 3 shows some of them. Most standards are elaborated not
only targeting a given problematics but also considering the specificities of an
application domain. In the safety area, the standard IEC-61508 [7] is a generic
reference to conduct functional safety analyses of so called Electrical-Electronic-
Electronically Programmable (E/E/EP) systems. This generic standard has been
taken as a reference in order to adapt and specialize the safety analyses for differ-
ent application domains. An analogous pattern can be found in the development
of standards pertaining to the security area (e.g., considering ISO-27005 [3] as a
generic standard). However, the level of maturity, consensus and/or adoption of
security standards is still limited and many discussions and work are in progress.
This disparity can be partially explained by the late identification of security as
a strategic topic in the industry-research landscape. In addition, the analysis
of security introduces specificities and new elements which raise questions and
increase the complexity of discussions.
Fig. 3. Overview of some relevant standards for safety and security
Standards not only provide a conceptual basis but also guidelines for the
integration of concerns in the development cycle. Thus, development cycles can
be accordingly completed via the integration of safety and security aspects. A
representative instance of such integrated process can be found in the ISO-26262
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standard [2] (safety of road vehicles). A common practice of safety and security
engineering will demand and integration of both safety and security aspects.
3.2 Towards an unified development cycle
If a development process integrating safety and security aspects is required, such
integration does not suffice to achieve an effective safety-security co-engineering.
For instance, typical standalone instances of safety and security development
cycles include a requirements elicitation phase. A naive integration can consist
in first elicit safety requirements and afterwards the security requirements (or
conversely). This sequential integration may result inefficient and may even be
ineffective, since it does not address potential conflicts between requirements. In
addition, conflicts may not only appear during the problem definition phases but
also during the solution phases in the development cycle, e.g., a cypher mech-
anism deployed to protect frames confidentiality may impact system’s perfor-
mance and violate real-time safety constraints. Therefore, a unified development
cycle should not only consider the integration of development processes and
phases, but also the specific methods and techniques used in safety and security
- in addition to the specificities of the application domains. The achievement of
such unified development cycle shall be a milestone of industry-research working
groups. However its definition is limited by: (1) the observed disparity between
security and safety standards (maturity, consensus and adoption), and (2) the
complexity of ensuring coherence between safety and security methods and tech-
niques.
4 Model-driven approaches for co-engineering
The importance of integrating not only processes but also methods for safety
and security analyses was highlighted in previous section. This section pro-
vides insights on model-driven engineering (MDE) techniques for achieving co-
engineering of safety and security.
4.1 Safety and security engineering commonalities
The current state of practice shows that safety and security engineering are con-
ducted in standalone mode and guided by independent processes and methods.
Figure 4 shows an overview of two instances of processes to conduct safety and
security activities in the development cycle. To tackle the structural complexity
and integrate both processes into a single one, the following high level common-
alities are observed:
– The usage of evaluation criteria is present in both processes and some criteria
rely upon discrete evaluation scales (qualitative and quantitative).
– Both processes demand the definition of metrics or scales to evaluate risks,
likelihood, and severity.
Towards safety and security co-engineering 7
– Both processes are risk oriented and the evaluation of risks is based upon
likelihood and severity scales.
– A function to evaluate the acceptability of risks exists in both processes.
– The elicitation of Feared Events is targeted in both processes.
Regarding the last item, notice that Feared Events identified during the safety
analysis might be also targeted by attackers. Conversely, some Feared Events,
unveiled during the security analysis, might also be caused by purely accidental
functional failures. In such cases, common or interdependent Feared Events can
be the basis to conduct the expected co-engineering.
Fig. 4. Overview of standalone safety and security development processes
4.2 Model-driven approaches for multi-concern analyses
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with Model Driven Engineering (MDE)
principles and techniques. Non-savvy readers can consult these references [16],
[17]. MDE has been applied to support engineers during several phases of the
development cycle, e.g., design and verification [8], [9]. In particular, during the
design phases a model of the target system is usually constructed. The model
is based upon standardized languages like UML [10] and SysML [11] which fa-
cilitate typical design tasks like system structuring, refinement, decomposition,
extension, and/or transformation. MDE languages are flexible enough to be ex-
tended and specialized so as to capture the elements necessary to conduct safety
and security analyses. Indeed, fundamental concepts, the relationships between
them, and analyses steps can also be represented and implemented. Following
typical MDE approaches, the system model can be enriched either with the ele-
ments related to safety or security. Annotating finally yields two models suitable
to -separately- conduct safety or security analyses (see Figure 5); the annotated
models are insufficient to support joint safety-security analyses. However, they
provide a basis to construct the co-engineering framework as explained in next
subsection.
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Fig. 5. View of safety and security models obtained after annotations
4.3 Joint safety-security engineering
To support joint safety-security analyses (co-engineering), the MDE framework
can be leveraged in the following way:
Integration of meta-models. Safety and security annotations are defined in
separated meta-models. The meta-models allow to capture the fundamental
notions, principles associated to the concern and also capture their relation-
ships. The conceptual alignment, necessary to achieve joint safety-security
analyses, can be initiated by identifying common elements, prior to a first
integration of meta-models. The Figure 6 shows an excerpt of a diagram
used to associate concepts pertaining to different standards.
Fig. 6. Excerpt of a diagram showing meta-models integration
Solving conflicts. Once meta-models are aligned by linking common parts,
the dependencies can be observed and the potential conflicts along methods
phases can be better identified and solved. Recall that conflicts can appear
from the application of safety and security methods and techniques and also
between their outcomes. In particular, when a technique is applied over mod-
eling instances that are out of common parts in the integrated metamodel.
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Integration of processes and phases. Once method phases are supposed to
be “free of conflicts”, the processes can be integrated. Notice that certain
conflicts can not be identified in advance at method level. For instance, con-
flicts between safety and security requirements - elicited at different phases
- can appear after a first architecture design is made. A safety-security de-
velopment cycle should consider this kind of issues.
Framework implementation. The framework supporting joint safety-security
analyses can be implemented following typical MDE development steps:
metamodel implementation via a UML/SysML profile, generation of pro-
file code, implementation of safety and security algorithms, customization of
the framework front-end, and building the tool product.
5 Difficulties to achieve integration of safety and security
processes and their adoption
In previous section, a generic, coarse description was provided about leveraging
MDE techniques in order to achieve safety-security co-engineering. Our involve-
ment in several academy-industry projects (AMASS, SESNA, ModSe´cAe´ro) al-
lows us to ensure the effectiveness of those MDE techniques. By doing so, several
technical and non technical difficulties have been identified which may limit the
progress of ongoing work. First, regarding the current state of standalone safety
and security development processes, they are in general complex, costly and
mostly human based: few support for tasks automation exists. Despite there ex-
ist development processes that show certain integration of safety and security
aspects (e.g., [5]), they are rather specific to an application domain. In general,
a low level of maturity is observed in aspects like integration, tool support and
automation. Other aspects impacting the dissemination and progress of safety-
security co-engineering are related to current engineering practices. Globally,
conduct joint safety-security analyses is a quite recent research and engineering
area. To our knowledge, information about case studies showing co-engineering
in practice are rare. In addition, there is almost no published feedback from in-
dustry on the effectiveness of applied methods and techniques. It is reasonable
to believe that some years are still necessary to consolidate our understand-
ing on the topic. For many industry sectors and several application domains,
cyber-security is almost an emerging concern. In those cases, an a posteriori
reaction to cyber-security threats is observed: the lack of awarness on cyber-
security risks/culture often leads to underestimate, misunderstand or believe not
concerned by the potential threats. Some market, organizational and engineers
practices may facilitate the adoption of safety-security engineering processes. In
particular, certification is a powerful mechanism to align technical criteria and
ensure trustworthiness what finally shapes markets. However today, no certifica-
tion process for safety-security critical systems exists so far. Last but not least,
the impact of safety and security concerns in current organizations and engineer
practices should be better identified in order to facilitate the adoption of an
integrated development cycle.
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6 Integration of safety and security techniques
This section is dedicated to explain an instance of techniques integration. The
chosen techniques are usually applied in safety and security. The instance is
relevant since it helps to highlight some challenges for a consistent safety-security
intertwining.
6.1 Combined attack-fault trees
Fault and attack trees are known techniques respectively used in safety and secu-
rity areas. They are means to structure and evaluate unwanted events impacting
a target system. On one side, fault trees are often composed by nodes represent-
ing system failures as boolean variables. The fault nodes are linked by logical
gates AND, OR and can be assigned with a probability of occurrence. On the
other side attack trees can be composed by nodes representing vulnerable states
of the system, attacker actions, or conditions for attack progression. They are
also linked by logical gates AND, OR. Despite the assignation of probabilities to
attack nodes has been suggested, the estimation and interpretation of outcomes
are still arguable (more details in subsection 6.4). Several approaches have been
proposed to integrate (merge) fault and attack trees, e.g., [13]. However, the inte-
gration is mostly structural and, in general, several issues still remain unsolved.
Some pros and cons observed in approaches for tree merging are described in
the following items:
Pros: Most algorithms for integration of fault and attack trees have a polyno-
mial complexity on the number of nodes. Those algorithms can be imple-
mented thus providing support for automatically merging trees. In certain
cases, the attack tree is transformed towards a fault tree yielding a merged
tree with a simpler structure. It is also observed that safety metrics and
functions are often reused for evaluating certain properties of attacks. In
particular, the failure rate and the Mean Time to Failure inspire their se-
curity counterparts, namely, Attack rate, and Mean Time to Attack. These
metrics and functions are useful to estimate the probability of attacks oc-
currence.
Cons: The variety of attack tree nodes semantics seems broader than their
safety counterparts. Indeed, irrespective of the reference considered, the def-
inition of fault trees remains mostly equivalent. On the contrary, there is no
common definition for attack trees and consequently a rather heterogeneous
variety of definitions exist. No common semantic for attack tree nodes can be
identified so far. As a consequence, nodes describing attack steps or actions,
can be specified at different levels of abstraction and granularity. Since vul-
nerabilities can be present at different system levels (HW/SW) and caused
by different types of flaws, the tree nodes representing them are also het-
erogeneous. Attack nodes representing the conditions for attack progression
show similar characteristics. Referred specificities suggest that, to keep con-
sistency, fault and attack trees merging shall mostly remain a human-based
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task. Since the semantics and nature of nodes (safety and security events) are
different, reusing safety metrics and functions to evaluate security aspects
should be more thoroughly considered.
6.2 Discussion on metrics for safety assessment
The so called Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is a central metrics applied in
safety to estimate systems life and other related features. The MTBF is com-
puted by obtaining the mathematical mean of a probability distribution function
(pdf) with exponential basis (see Figure 7). The exponential pdf measures the
probability of failures occurrence and is characterized by its parameter λ: λ is
a failure rate which measures the failures of a component (or system) per time
unit. However, as shown in Figure 7, the exponential-based pdf is not the only
probability distribution available.
Fig. 7. Some metrics and functions used for systems safety assessment
The exponential pdf is currently adopted as a valid metric thanks to (1) the
experiments that can be conducted to compute λ and (2) the effectiveness of
MTBF predictions w.r.t. systems life observed at field. These facts imply that a
suitable correspondence between the mathematical model and the physical phe-
nomenon (systems ageing) has been settled. One of the main hypothesis for the
estimation of the MTBF is that the failure rate λ remains constant. However, the
validity of this hypothesis is limited. The Figure 8 depicts the actual evolution of
components failure rate across their life time. It is observed that the failure rate
is mostly constant during a life interval (called normal), but rapidly changes dur-
ing youth and ageing stages. All in all, even if the mathematical model reflects
the essence of a phenomenon, it remains constrained by the validity of hypothe-
ses. Recent experimental results show that certain MTBF predictions may differ
from real life time of systems observed at field [14]. According to this study,
the failure rate λ is not only determined by the physics of components, their
nominal usage, and the exposure to a given environment. It also depends upon
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the quality of the process for components (and subcomponents) development.
Moreover, accidental damages, occurred during manufacturing, may over-stress
the components and finally increase their failure rate. A more precise calculation
of λ shall require to consider previous factors.
Fig. 8. Typical evolution of failure rate across time. The graph is borrowed from [14]
6.3 Discussion on metrics for security assessment
Many approaches found in the literature rely upon variants of the exponential-
based pdf to estimate the probability of an attack. However, not many address
the question about the adequacy of this mathematical model w.r.t. the phe-
nomenon, i.e., the attack progression. The work in [12] provides experimental
results on the time to compromise a large informatics system. The proposed
metrics is named Mean Time to First Attack (MTFA) and is calculated from
data gathered from intrusions at field. The collected data are used to compute
attacks frequency and afterwards to calculate parameters of several pdf ’s (and in
particular λ). The predictions of the MTFA relying upon different pdf ’s are then
compared to the real periods of attacks’ occurrence. The results of the compari-
son show that the best fitted model is not the exponential but the Pareto based
pdf [12]. Thus, it is reasonable to question about other potential mismatches like
the one just identified for the safety assessment metrics. In particular, whether
the attack rate remains constant along a given period during the systems life.
Or even whether the use of the attack rate suffices to characterize the whole
phenomenon which involves threats and vulnerabilities. A first element to an-
swer these questions is that, along with factors affecting elements manufacturing
(quality of development process, accidental damages), the attack rate is likely
also impacted by other factors appearing before and during attack execution.
Those factors could be identified and analyzed by considering the phases of at-
tack preparation and deployment. The so called intrusion kill chain [15] (see
Figure 9) defines several attack phases which can be useful for that purpose.
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Fig. 9. Phases of the so named intrusion kill chain. Image borrowed from [15]
6.4 Perspectives for consistent assessment of safety and security
The use of field data to validate a mathematical model for attack prediction
seems a consistent approach. However, the metrics used for security assessment
may need to be validated in larger case studies and for other kind of systems. The
pdf ’s for predicting security (and also safety) events occurrence might be better
rely upon other basis than the exponential. Further studies may help to identify
the accuracy of predictions already obtained with the exponential model. To gain
representativeness in the security assessment, larger and more diversified field
data are necessary, for instance, data from different attack categories, known
vulnerabilities, and application domains. To improve the computation of attack
rates, factors related to attack preparation and deployment phases need to be
introduced, for instance, attacker resources, skills, smartness, and motivations.
Nonetheless, increasing the accuracy of a mathematical model also increases its
complexity, and the cost and complexity of the prediction method. Consequently,
more guidance and support will be necessary to bring forward these suggestions.
7 Overall perspectives
Safety and security co-engineering is rather a young area and further works
and progress are expected to gain in maturity. Regarding the conceptual and
processes integration, certain engineering techniques (like MDE) will contribute
to consolidate the the co-engineering of safety and security. However, certain
specificities of each area will remain and it is likely that standalone develop-
ment practices will prevail for a while. The choice of a unified safety-security
development cycle seems feasible but its deployment and adoption remains, for
now, complex and costly to achieve. Further methodological and tool support
are needed to help concerned communities to overcome these issues. Regarding
the metrics for safety-security assessment, the consistency and validity of metrics
need to be ensured in order to achieve more accurate predictions. The application
of mathematical models in security assessment still needs further validations.
14 Gabriel Pedroza
References
1. SAE International : ARP4754A - Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and
Systems. SAE International, https://www.sae.org/standards/content/arp4754a/,
2010.
2. International Organization for Standardization: ISO 26262 - Road vehicles - Func-
tional safety. ISO, https://www.iso.org/standard/43464.html, 2011.
3. International Organization for Standardization: ISO 27005 - Information tech-
nology - Security techniques - Information security risk management. ISO,
https://www.iso.org/standard/75281.html, 2018.
4. Agence Nationale de la Se´curite´ des Syste`mes d’Information: EBIOS - Ex-
pression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Se´curite´. ANSSI,
https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/guide/ebios-2010-expression-des-besoins-et-identification-
des-objectifs-de-securite/, 2010.
5. European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment: ED202 - Airworthiness Se-
curity Process Specification. EUROCAE, https://eurocae.net/, 2014.
6. European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment: ED203 - Airworthiness Se-
curity Methods and Considerations. EUROCAE, https://eurocae.net/, 2018.
7. International Electrotechnical Commission: IEC 61508 - Functional safety
of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. IEC,
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/22273 2010.
8. G. Pedroza, M. S. Idrees, L. Apvrille and Y. Roudier: A Formal Methodology Ap-
plied to Secure Over-the-Air Automotive Applications. In: Vehicular Technology
Conference (VTC Fall) on Proceedings, pp. 1–5. IEEE, San Francisco, CA, 2011.
9. B. Hamid, S. Gu¨rgens, A. Fuchs: Security patterns modeling and formalization
for pattern-based development of secure software systems. Journal Innovations in
Systems and Software Engineering, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 109–140. Springer, London,
2016.
10. Object Management Group: Unified Modeling Language specification. OMG,
https://www.omg.org/spec/UML/About-UML/, 2017.
11. Object Management Group: System Modeling Language specification. OMG,
https://www.omg.org/spec/SysML/About-SysML/, 2017.
12. H. Holm: A Large-Scale Study of the Time Required to Compromise a Computer
System. In: Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing on Proceedings,
IEEE, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 2–15, Jan.-Feb. 2014.
13. Igor Nai Fovino, Marcelo Masera, Alessio De Cian: Integrating cyber attacks within
fault trees. In: Reliability Engineering & System Safety, ScienceDirect, LNCS Else-
vier, vol. 94, issue 9, pp. 1394-1402, 2009.
14. Institut pour la Maˆıtrise des Risques: Experimentation
of the new Reliability prediction method FIDES. IMDR,
https://eeepitnl.tksc.jaxa.jp/mews/en/20th/data/1 10.pdf, 2017.
15. U.S. Senate-Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: A
“Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach-March 26 2013,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/, USA, 2014.
16. Object Management Group, https://www.omg.org, 2019.
17. The Eclipse Foundation: Papyrus, https://www.eclipse.org/papyrus/, 2019.
